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Abstract
This article sets out the legal duty of the 
United States of America to provide victims 
of torture and cruel, inhumane and degrad-
ing treatment (CIDT) the right to full 
rehabilitation under international law, 
including those still detained at the facility at 
Guantánamo Bay. After an examination of 
some of the torture methods used on these 
detainees, while they were in the custody of 
the CIA and arguably afterwards, it goes on 
to indicate the current obstacles to rehabili-
tation, including on-going incarceration, lack 
of impunity, classification of medical 
documents and limited access to non-mili-
tary staff. Limited options for possible 
psychological assistance towards the right to 
rehabilitation are considered.
Keywords: Torture, International Law; prison-
ers, Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment, detention, security, rehabilitation, 
survivors, Guantánamo.
Introduction
In the early 2000’s, the United States 
adopted a policy of using torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment 
(CIDT) against Muslim men considered to 
be terror suspects. The techniques were 
initially authorized for use by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and later “bled” into 
detention operations conducted by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) in Afghani-
stan, Iraq, and Guantánamo (Constitution 
Project, 2013). Although President George 
W. Bush never acknowledged that the 
techniques used during brutal CIA interro-
gations constituted torture or CIDT, 
President Obama finally admitted in 2014 
that, “We tortured some folks.”  That same 
year, a declassified, redacted Executive 
Summary of a Congressional investigation 
documented some of the shocking details of 
the CIA’s “Rendition, Detention, and 
Interrogation” program (SSCI, 2014). 
The techniques certainly did not “hide in 
a vault at the CIA” (Biswas & Zalloua, 2011, 
p.27). Human beings tortured other human 
beings - yet under the guise of national 
security, the torturers have enjoyed impunity. 
One of them (Dr. James Mitchell, one of the 
psychologists who developed the CIA 
program) is currently promoting a memoir 
about his work with the CIA, and elaborates 
on his view of the characters and motivations 
Key inssues:
•  The United States has a legal duty to 
provide rehabilitation to the current 
detainees under international law.
• The conditions under which detainees 
are held make it impossible to physi-
cally or mentally rehabilitate them, or 
even to provide them with basic 
medical assistance.
• Innovative ways must be found to try to 
assist with rehabilitation when the 
prospect of being set free remains elusive.
*United States Department of Defense, Military 
Commissions Defense Organization. 
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of the detainees whom he tortured. Mean-
while, many of the survivors remain impris-
oned at Guantánamo Bay and unable to 
speak freely about their suffering. The 
continuing effects of torture on these men, 
and their lack of access to medical treatment, 
are the subjects of this article.
The United States has signed and ratified 
the UN Convention Against Torture 
(“CAT”) which mandates treatment for all 
survivors of torture, including those at 
Guantánamo Bay (Chlopak, 2002). Article 
14 of the CAT explicitly requires that every 
state party ensures that torture victims have 
“enforceable rights” to compensation, which 
includes “the means for as full rehabilitation 
as possible.” The Committee against Torturei 
has explained that the obligation of States 
parties to provide the means for ‘as full 
rehabilitation as possible’ refers to the need 
to restore and repair the harm suffered by 
the victim whose life situation, including 
dignity, health and self-sufficiency may never 
be fully recovered as a result of the pervasive 
effect of torture (Convention against Torture, 
2012, General Comment No. 3).ii Such 
rehabilitation “should be holistic and include 
medical and psychological care as well as 
legal and social services” (CAT 2012, 
General Comment No. 3). The CAT 
therefore recognizes an enforceable right of 
all torture survivors to receive rehabilitation, 
and a legal duty of the state to provide such 
rehabilitation. Importantly, the free-standing 
right to torture rehabilitation has been 
interpreted as “a universal duty to provide 
[victims] with health care and reintegrative 
services, without considerations as to 
whether formal complaints or court deci-
sions have been made, to who was responsi-
ble for the torture or where it happened” 
(Sveass, 2013). Recalling that the United 
States acknowledged the application of the 
CAT to the territory under its control at 
Guantánamo Bay in 2014, although the 
government insists that it does not create 
rights of action for Guantánamo detainees. 
(United States v. KSM, AE200II 2013). 
Nevertheless, the application of the CAT at 
Guantánamo legally means that regardless of 
“belligerent” or “clearance” status, every 
torture victim at Guantánamo must be given 
access to holistic rehabilitation by the 
government. That has not been the case. 
This article will summarize some of the 
obstacles to treatment of Guantánamo 
prisoners suffering from the effects of their 
torture and CIDT, and offer suggestions for 
amelioration of these obstacles. This article 
will not address the issue of treatment of 
those men who have been released or 
resettled from Guantánamo, who face 
overwhelming but distinct challenges. 
Background: The torture techniques
Beginning in 2002, the United States 
government actively sanctioned “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” for use on terror 
suspects, which included techniques 
long-recognized by international law to 
constitute torture or CIDT. In order to 
authorize the use of such techniques on 
terror suspects, members of the Bush 
administration issued legal memoranda 
disqualifying the application of 18 U.S.C. 
paras 2340-2340A, the United States 
anti-torture statute. In August 2002, 
then-Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee 
i The group of experts whose mandate is to interpret the 
treaty, receive and respond to periodic reports by state 
parties, and receive individual communications regarding 
potential violations by state parties. 
ii One of the many legal controversies at the United States 
Military Commissions at Guantánamo  Bay is the 
enforceability of the Convention Against Torture. One 
military commission has ruled that although the United 
States is bound by the Convention Against Torture, 
tortured individuals cannot enforce its provisions (United 
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stated in a memo to White House Counsel 
Alberto Gonzales that “for an act to consti-
tute torture as defined in Section 2340, it 
must inflict pain that is difficult to endure. 
Physical pain amounting to torture must be 
equivalent in intensity to the pain accompa-
nying serious physical injury, such as organ 
failure, impairment of bodily function, or 
even death.” (Bybee, 2002). Notwithstanding 
the comparison of “physical pain” to medical 
death, Mr. Bybee continued his analysis with 
a second memo enumerating the techniques 
to be used as “1. attention grasp, 2. walling, 
3. facial hold, 4. facial slap (insult slap), 5. 
cramped confinement, 6. wall standing, 7. 
stress positions, 8. sleep deprivation, 9. 
insects placed in a confinement box, and 10. 
the waterboard.” (Bybee, 2002). All of these 
techniques were approved by Bybee as 
consistent with the U.S. anti-torture statute. 
The torture of detainees was not merely 
sadism; the explicit goal was to achieve 
“learned helplessness” of the prisoners. “The 
goal of interrogation is to create a state of 
learned helplessness and dependence 
conducive to the collection of intelligence in 
a predictable, reliable, and sustainable 
manner” (CIA, 2004, p.2). Mitchell has 
described it as involving classical and 
avoidance conditioning (Mitchell, 2016).
Two memos issued in 2005 by Steven 
Bradbury, former Acting Assistant Attorney-
General, re-evaluate the CIA’s interrogation 
techniques. In the first memo, Bradbury 
slightly modified Bybee’s assessment of the 
legal standard, stating that techniques 
violating the anti-torture statute must cause 
“severe physical or mental pain and suffer-
ing,” but dropping the “organ failure” level 
of severity in the definition. (Bradbury, 
2005a). Bradbury’s first memo, entitled 
“Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to 
Certain Techniques That May Be Used in 
the Interrogation of a High Value Al Qaeda 
Detainee,” enumerates a slightly different list 
of techniques, however – giving rise to 
questions regarding how the techniques 
changed in the intervening years: 1. Dietary 
manipulationiii, 2. Nudityiv, 3. Attention 
grasp, 4. Walling, 5. Facial hold, 6. Facial 
slap (insult slap), 7. Abdominal slap, 8. 
Cramped confinement, 9. Wall standingv, 10. 
Stress positions, 11. Water dousingvi, and 12. 
Sleep deprivation.vii The last two techniques 
were particularly damaging: the redacted 
Executive Summary of the SSCI Report 
states that “[t]he waterboarding technique . . 
. was physically harmful, inducing convul-
sions and vomitings . . . Internal CIA records 
describe the waterboarding of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammad as a ‘series of near-drownings,’” 
which would seem to place them legally 
within “organ failure” level of physical 
disruption (SSCI, 2014, p. 3). 
The second Bradbury memo is entitled 
“Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 
iii Bradbury memo 1: 900 kcal/day plus 10 kcal/kg/day, 
multiplied by 1.2 for a sedentary detainee. 
iv Used to cause “psychological discomfort,” with ambient 
temperature to be kept at 68 degrees Fahrenheit and “no 
sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse permitted.” As we 
now know, this stricture was not followed.  
v Standing 4-5 feet away from a wall with arms 
outstretched to the wall, without permission to move 
hands or feet. There is no maximum time period 
guidance given for use of this technique.  
vi 20 minutes duration of pouring allowed if water was 
41 degrees Fahrenheit; 40 minutes with water 
temperature of 50 degrees; or 60 minutes with water 
temperature of 59 degrees.  
vii Maximum duration allowed was 180 hours before 
detainee had to be allowed to sleep “without interruption 
for at least eight hours.” According to the SSCI Redacted 
Executive Summary,  “CIA interrogators subsequently 
reported subjecting Adnan al-Libi to sleep deprivation 
sessions of 46.5 hours, 24 hours, and 48 hours, with a 



























S P E C I A L  S E C T I O N :  I N  T H E  N A M E  O F  T H E  W A R  O N  T E R R O R  
[the United States anti-torture statute] to the 
Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the 
Interrogation of High Value CIA Detainees” 
(Bradbury Memo to Rizzo on Combined 
Use, 2005). This memo reflects reality at the 
CIA black sites, more than any of the 
previous memos, in that it contemplates (and 
provides legal authorization) for use of the 
above techniques in combination, which is 
how the CIA had applied them from the 
beginning of detention in 2002. As the SSCI 
said in the redacted Executive Summary of 
its report on CIA rendition:
"Beginning with the CIA's first detainee, 
Abu Zubaydah, and continuing  with 
numerous others, the CIA applied its 
enhanced interrogation techniques with 
significant repetition for days or weeks at 
a time.  Interrogation techniques such as 
slaps and ‘wallings’ (slamming detainees 
against a wall) were used in combination, 
frequently concurrent with sleep depriva-
tion and nudity. Records do not support 
CIA representations that the CIA initially 
used an ‘open, non-threatening ap-
proach,’ or that interrogations began with 
the ‘least coercive technique possible’ and 
escalated to more coercive techniques 
only as necessary (SSCI, 2014, p. 3)."
To demonstrate the combined use of torture 
techniques, the SSCI describes CIA sleep 
deprivation as “keeping detainees awake for 
up to 180 hours, usually standing or in stress 
positions, at times with their hands shackled 
above their heads. At least five CIA detainees 
experienced disturbing hallucinations during 
prolonged sleep deprivation, and, in at least 
two of those cases, the CIA nonetheless 
continued the sleep deprivation” (SSCI, 
2014, p. 3). 
We also know that multiple techniques 
were used that had not been “legally 
authorized” by the U.S. Department of 
Justice. Multiple detainees were anally 
penetrated using “the largest Ewal [sic] tube” 
CIA officials had, for the sole purpose of 
demonstrating the “interrogator’s ‘total 
control’” over the tortured men, in accord-
ance with the “learned helplessness” model 
designed by Mitchell and his colleague Bruce 
Jessen (SSCI, 2014, pp. 100, 82). During 
anal penetration of detainees, CIA officials 
would sometimes insert pureed food items, 
including “hummus, pasta with sauce, nuts, 
and raisins” (SSCI, 2014, p. 100).
The CIA also used loud music or white 
noise, constant light, and shaving as extralegal 
techniques. The SSCI recounts how despite 
the CIA’s assurances that shaving was only 
conducted upon intake and was not punitive, 
“Detainees were routinely shaved, sometimes 
as an aid to interrogation; detainees who were 
participating at an acceptable level were 
permitted to grow their hair and beards” 
(SSCI, 2014, p. 429). The CIA also “use[d] 
music at decibels exceeding the representa-
tions to [the Department of Justice],” and 
“numerous detainees were subjected to the 
extended use of white noise” (SSCI, 2014, p. 
429). Again, this clearly violated the prohibi-
tion detailed in Bradbury’s memo on “severe 
mental pain or suffering.”
The United States government claims 
that use of torture techniques ended when 
the CIA detainees arrived at Guantánamo 
Bay in September 2006. However, this claim 
discounts the separate allegations of torture 
and CIDT during at least the first five years 
of military detention at Guantánamo 
(2002-2007), and also ignores the allegations 
by some former CIA detainees that use of 
torture techniques has continued at Camp 7, 
where they are held. These allegations are 
detailed below. It also ignores that under the 
CAT, failure to provide torture rehabilitation 
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Current conditions of the tortured at 
Guantánamo 
Despite an effort to reduce the prison 
population at the close of the Obama Admin-
istration, 41 prisoners remained at Guan-
tánamo on January 20, 2017. These prison-
ers include some of the most well-known of 
the men to experience U.S. interrogation 
methods: Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, Abu 
Zubaydah, Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, and 
Mohammad al Qahtani. They also include 
the authors’ client, Ammar al Baluchi.
As al Baluchi has described, “Years later I 
still have trigger responses to sound and scents 
among other things. The intense feelings of the 
torture flood in and are often unexpected 
when they come. The threats and fear 
continue to plague me daily making it difficult 
to not remember the torture that I still 
endure” (Amnesty International, 2017, p.19). 
Although all of the Guantánamo 
prisoners are Muslim, they are otherwise 
culturally diverse. The 41 prisoners come 
from 13 countries (Rosenberg, 2017). Many 
are Arabs, but many are not. Many speak 
Arabic as their first language, but many do 
not. Many have post-secondary education, 
but many do not. This diversity of back-
grounds has resulted in wide variations in the 
presentation of trauma and impact on mental 
health (Sayed 2003). 
In 2016, New York Times reporters 
conducted the most comprehensive review of 
the mental health consequences of the U.S. 
government’s interrogation methods to date. 
The New York Times concluded that, “After 
enduring agonizing treatment in secret 
C.I.A. prisons or coercive practices at the 
military detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba, dozens of detainees developed 
persistent mental health problems . . . .” 
(Apuzzo, Fink, & Risen 2016). It found that, 
“At least half of the 39 people who went 
through the C.I.A.’s ‘enhanced interrogation’ 
program, which included depriving them of 
sleep, dousing them with ice water, slamming 
them into walls and locking them in coffin-
like boxes, have since shown psychiatric 
problems.” (Apuzzo, Fink & Risen 2016). 
Although reviews of detainee medical 
records are severely limited by many of the 
factors discussed in this article, one record 
review in 2011 found that each of the nine 
reviewed “detainees continues to experience 
severe, long-term and debilitating psycho-
logical symptoms that are likely to persist for 
many years, and possibly a lifetime” (Iaco-
pino & Xenakis, 2011, p.4). Declassified 
portions of a classified psychological 
assessment of al Nashiri show that he shows 
long-term effects of his torture, including 
continuing nightmares, a phobia of water, 
and other signs of post-traumatic stress 
(Savage, 2017). Other detainees, including al 
Baluchi, have complained of similar, or 
worse, sequelae (Amnesty International, 
2017, p. 19). 
Obstacles to rehabilitation at 
Guantánamo
Some of the obstacles to torture rehabilita-
tion at Guantánamo are the same/similar to 
those faced by treatment seekers and 
providers the world over. For example, “[d]
escribing the physically and psychologically 
painful experiences of being tortured can 
itself be an exceptionally painful and 
overwhelming process” (Pope, 2012, p.421). 
The brain organizes itself around “a pre-
sumed permanent need for defense,” (Elbert 
et al., 2011, p.167), and torture survivors 
often simply cannot recall the details care 
providers and attorneys want to know. 
Guantánamo does, however, present a 
number of rare or even unique challenges to 
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Threatening environment
The first and most obvious obstacle to 
torture rehabilitation at Guantánamo is that 
the torture survivors are also prisoners, as 
the United States continues to incarcerate 
the men, ostensibly under the law of war. 
Eight men are charged and face proceedings 
in a military commission; two others have 
been convicted but not yet sentenced; and 
another is serving a sentence while his case is 
on appeal. The other thirty men do not face 
charges. This dual role of detainee/prisoner 
and torture survivor is a result of the policy 
decision to use torture on terror suspects. 
“Torture is also justified by the crimes and 
identities of the terrorists—they are the 
‘worst of the worst. . . .’ But while the bodies 
of prisoners may be subject to violence for 
the extraction of information, they [must 
now also be] objects of care” for the govern-
ment, which is inherently contradictory. 
(Biswas & Zalloua, 2011,103).
Some suggest that torture rehabilitation 
is impossible in this prison environment. For 
example, prominent torture rehabilitation 
center Freedom from Torture has proposed, 
“the environmental context in which 
rehabilitative services are offered must be safe 
and stable” (PRI, 2013). Guantánamo fails 
both the objective and subjective compo-
nents of these criteria, given that prisoners 
and their medical care remain in the 
complete control of the Department of 
Defense. Indeed, most of the factors 
mentioned in this article could be viewed as 
demonstrating the unsafe environment and 
instability of Guantánamo as a context for 
torture treatment.
Others may suggest that torture treatment 
at Guantánamo would be counterproductive. 
“If the government does not change and/or if, 
as happened in Chile and Argentina, those 
committing these acts receive immunity from 
prosecution, any modicum of rehabilitation for 
the victims is compromised by the daily 
reminder of their own powerlessness in the face 
of the continuing power of their tormentors. 
The psychological consequences of impunity 
exacerbate the damage” (Fields, 2008, p. 154). 
Although these concerns are real, there 
are still two reasons to consider the viability 
of any torture treatment that might be 
possible. First, the U.S. legal position that it 
has the right to incarcerate the Guantánamo 
prisoners under the law of war does not 
relieve the United States of the duty, or the 
prisoners of the right, of torture rehabilita-
tion under international law. Second, the 
issue of incarcerated torture survivors is not 
unique to Guantánamo. “There is not a good 
methodology to calculate the magnitude of 
the problem of torture worldwide, but the 
numbers of torture survivors should be 
several million” (Quiroga & Jaranson, 2005, 
p. 70). The United Nations Special Rappor-
teur on Torture visit prisons around the 
world and are mandated to submit urgent 
appeals regarding the torture of prisoners or 
lack of medical treatment for tortured 
prisoners. Therefore, although Guantánamo 
may be a unique prison setting, methods of 
verifiably ending torture and effectively 
treating torture survivors within prison 
conditions must be developed. 
Isolation
Guantánamo prisoners are currently divided 
into two groups for detention purposes. 
Approximately 15 so-called “High Value 
Detainees” are generally detained in Camp 
7, which a reviewing admiral in 2009 said 
was “effectively” a “supermax facility” 
(Walsh, 2009). The remaining approximately 
26 prisoners are in Camp 6 [other camps], 
which the reviewing admiral described as 
“designed by U.S. standards for maximum 
security detention” (Walsh, 2009). An officer 
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possible to earn a transfer from Camp 7 to 
Camp 6 [another camp] through good behavior 
(United States v. KSM, AE448 2016, p.6). 
Two declassified sources have demon-
strated at least some involvement of the CIA 
in Camp 7 beyond the prisoners’ transfer 
from black sites in 2006. First, the SSCI 
wrote, “After the 14 CIA detainees arrived at 
the U.S. military base at Guantánamo Bay, 
they were housed in a separate building from 
other U.S. military detainees and remained 
under the operational control of the CIA” 
(SSCI, 2014, p.160). Second, the CIA in 
2016 declassified a highly redacted Memo-
randum of Agreement between the CIA and 
Department of Defense regarding Camp 7 
(Memorandum of Agreement, 2006). Among 
other things, this “sets out the duties and 
responsibilities of DoD and CIA concerning 
DoD’s detention of certain individuals 
designated by the President to be transferred 
to the control of the Secretary of Defense, 
who were captured in the War on Terrorism 
and who have conducted and/or have 
engaged in planning for, terrorist acts against 
US persons or interests” (Memorandum of 
Agreement, 2006). 
Given that the very existence of Camp 7 
was classified until 2008 very few details 
about it exist publicly (Rosenberg, 2008). 
One of the authors (James Connell) is among 
the few who have been inside Camp 7, 
pursuant to a military commission order, but 
classification restrictions prevent discussion 
of details. Two prisoners, however, have 
testified about their perception that torturous 
conditions mimicking the CIA black sites 
continue in Camp 7.
Ramzi bin al Shibh is a 45-year-old 
Yemeni man accused of participation in the 
planning of the 9/11 attacks (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Bin 
al Shibh has consistently accused U.S. 
authorities of subjecting him to “sounds and 
vibrations” in his cell at Camp 7 that 
prevented him from sleeping and affected his 
health. In Mitchell’s 2016 book, he discussed 
using vibration on bin al Shibh (allegedly by a 
piece of heavy machinery) at the black sites 
(Mitchell, 2016). Nevertheless, Guantánamo 
authorities have denied bin al Shibh’s claim, 
and in 2013 prosecutors used bin al Shibh’s 
allegation to seek evaluation of his mental 
state (Ramstack, 2013). The evaluators could 
not reach a conclusion given the information 
available to them, which at the time did not 
include Mitchell’s book, but would have 
included bin al Shibh’s CIA medical records, 
which are in the government’s possession and 
may have included reference to the vibration 
technique at the black sites (Serrano, 2014). 
In February 2016, bin al Shibh testified 
before the military commission about what 
he deemed systematic and intentional “noise 
and vibrations” inside Camp 7. During his 
testimony, he said that when he protested 
about the sounds, a U.S. Navy psychiatrist 
drugged him. He described being drugged: 
“[T]he worst time in my life was at that 
moment when they gave me injection, more 
worse than black site. Black site was abuse, 
was physical abuse, was torture. But this one, 
the injection without any reasons, that was 
the worst thing I have ever went through” 
(Transcript, Testimony of Ramzi bin al Shibh, 
2016, p.11142). 
Later, in 2016, another prisoner known as 
Hassan Guleed also testified about the 
conditions of confinement at Camp 7. He 
said, “we have mental torturing [torture] 
here at Camp 7 . . .the noises are different, 
sometimes hammering, high-pitched noises, 
chemical smell… for six years” (Transcript, 
Testimony of Hassan Guleed Dourad, 2016, 
p.12180). Another element that Guleed 
revealed was the 2009 opening of the 
so-called “beanholes” – the slots in each 



























S P E C I A L  S E C T I O N :  I N  T H E  N A M E  O F  T H E  W A R  O N  T E R R O R  
are passed (2016, p.12176). Guleed stated 
that prior to 2009, Camp 7 prisoners could 
not open or communicate with one another 
through the beanholes. Prisoners are 
currently allowed to open their beanholes.  
 
Untrained legal teams
This strict isolation means that generally the 
only people, other than prison staff, who have 
regular access to Guantánamo prisoners are 
each prisoner’s legal team, if the prisoner has 
one. Legal teams are provided by the 
Department of Defense’s Military Commis-
sions Defense Organization, for those 
detainees in active trial proceedings at 
Guantánamo. The core members of the legal 
teams are attorneys, paralegals, investigators, 
intelligence analysts, and linguists. No legal 
team is allocated an independent psychologist 
for their client, although some teams have 
succeeded in obtaining funding for non-
Guantánamo -based security-cleared psychol-
ogists to meet occasionally with their clients. 
The legal teams themselves are not profes-
sionally trained in psychological issues, and 
are required to focus on litigation rather than 
treatment. In many ways, the legal teams are 
woefully unprepared to work with survivors 
of torture.
Many of the 41 prisoners remaining at 
Guantánamo – those not in active military 
commission proceedings - simply do not have 
a legal team. The United States government 
supports some representation: various 
Federal Public Defender offices, as well as 
non-governmental organizations like Re-
prieve, the Center for Constitutional Rights, 
the American Civil Liberties Union, pro bono 
lawyers and law firms representing prisoners 
seeking writs of habeas corpus in federal 
court, or other administrative or judicial 
relief. These legal teams have varying 
mandates and levels of resources. 
The identities of these legal teams can 
present severe challenges to building a 
trusting relationship. As Sveaass notes, the 
following factors are of crucial importance: 
“The level of confidence that the person has 
with respect to receiving rehabilitation 
services offered by the authorities, the 
question as to whether the person still lives 
in the state where violence has been commit-
ted and whether the necessary steps have 
been taken with regard to complaints, 
assessments and documentation” (Sveass 
2013). Those who work with survivors of tor-
ture must build on a foundation of trust, 
respect, believability, and sensitivity, recog-
nizing the political context of torture 
(Engstrom & Okamura, 2004). Not only are 
Guantánamo  prisoners still in the custody of 
the state that tortured them, without serious 
legal remedy for their acknowledged torture 
– but the Military Commission Defense 
Organization is primarily composed of U.S. 
military personnel. Many of its civilian and 
contract employees have military or intelli-
gence backgrounds similar to those of 
officials who initially tortured the prisoners 
at the black sites or at Guantánamo. All 
lawyers at Guantánamo must be able to 
obtain security clearances, which means that 
they must be U.S. citizens. Prisoners often 
suspect the loyalty or motives of their 
appointed legal teams. Some prisoners, 
lacking trust in the American legal system 
and their American lawyers, have declined 
representation altogether.
Beyond their identities, the military 
commission legal teams are by definition 
focused on legal matters, and lack psycho-
logical resources or training. Although the 
standard of practice in capital cases within 
the United States requires at least one team 
member qualified to screen for psychological 
issues, military commission funding authori-
ties have been slow to support psychiatric or 
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commission legal teams include a consultant 
psychologist or psychiatrist, but these experts 
must generally focus on evaluation rather 
than treatment.
 
A predominantly Western approach to medical 
treatment
As briefly mentioned, in order to be allowed 
contact with a Camp 7 prisoner (those 
prisoners tortured by the CIA at the black 
sites) a person generally must have a security 
clearance at the Top Secret/Secure Compart-
mented Information/Special Access Program 
level. Guantánamo authorities only allow 
contact with Camp 6 prisoners to people 
with Secret level clearances. These security 
restrictions mean that every person who has 
contact with Guantánamo prisoners is 
necessarily American.
American medical, psychological, and 
legal professionals, however well-meaning, 
do not align with the physical and mental 
illness conceptualizations of all of the 
culturally and ethnically diverse prisoners at 
Guantánamo (Sayed, 2003). “Culture has a 
major influence on how we understand, 
express, and resolve mental distress and 
medical symptoms” (Quiroga & Jaranson, 
2005, p. 41). For example, devout Muslims 
may discuss some of their symptoms in terms 
of the effects of Jinn or in distinction from 
the effects of Jinn.viii It is widely accepted 
amongst Muslims that Jinn are real creatures 
that are capable of causing physical and 
mental harm, such as possession (Khalifa & 
Hardie, 2005). Many Muslims also believe 
that Jinn can enter the human body and 
cause mental illness. Symptoms of Jinn 
possession could be forgetfulness, lack of 
energy and morbid fears (Khalifa, Hardie, 
Latif, Jamil, & Walker, 2011). American 
professionals, particularly the detention 
authorities at Guantánamo, have been quick 
to dismiss these complaints because they are 
expressed in an unfamiliar cultural vocabu-
lary. In 2014, hunger striker Abu Wa’el 
Dhiab challenged what he deemed to be 
inhumane force-feeding procedures at 
Guantánamo, and was ordered to undergo 
physical and psychological evaluations by 
independent (non-Guantánamo-affiliated) 
doctors. Dhiab had numerous problems with 
his legs and back, including broken ribs from 
being forcibly extracted from his cell, that 
required the use of a wheelchair during his 
13 years at Guantánamo.ix While the U.S. 
government said derisively that Dhiab 
suffered only “from self-described ‘genies’ in 
his legs,” (despite giving him morphine for 
his pain), in fact his psychological report 
stated that: 
"There is no evidence of hallucinations, 
delusions, or illusions. He refers to 
cultural traditions of ‘spirits or jins’ that 
can influence health and state of mind. 
His descriptions are appropriate to his 
culture and his physical complaints. 
Cognitive processes are intact (Xenakis 
Expert Report, 2014)"
Many other prisoners do not wish to discuss 
their symptoms because they do not think 
they will be believed – or worse, they believe 
that they will be drugged into silence as Bin 
al Shibh has been. The New York Times 
interviewed one Guantánamo doctor who 
recalled prescribing “powerful anti-psychot-
ics” after prisoners complained of being 
“plagued by jinns,” even as she wondered, 
“Are we doing the right thing?” (Fink 2016). 
viii Jinn are described in Islamic writings as created beings, 
that can see us but cannot be seen by humans. The origins 
of Jinn can be traced back to the Qur’an, originating 
before mankind from “smokeless flame of fire.” Jinn are 
said to inhabit dark places such as graveyards and caves 
and are known for tempting or seducing mankind to stray 
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Cultural humility is critical, and service 
providers need to acknowledge the “baggage 
they bring of their own cultures—their own 
ethnic backgrounds along with the culture of 
medicine—to the patient’s bedside, and that 
these may not necessarily be superior” 
(Fadiman, 2012). 
 In a limited capacity, there may be 
opportunities for Guantánamo prisoners to 
speak with linguists who share their language 
and even occasionally their cultural heritage. 
However, these linguists are not trained 
mental health providers and may not know 
the essential terminology or concepts needed 
to discuss symptoms and issues in a sensitive 
manner (Pope, 2012). Most importantly, 
their mandate is legal, rather than medical, 
and they are simply unequipped and unable 
to provide any kind of rehabilitation. 
Classification of medical information and 
treatment
One obstacle unusual to Guantánamo is the 
use of security classification to limit the 
transfer of medical information. The CIA 
high-value detainee program was “extraordi-
narily compartmentalized in order to 
maximize secrecy” (Khalili, 2013, p. 151), 
and much about the program remains 
classified, including the locations of the black 
sites and the personnel involved in the 
commission of torture. As a result, U.S. 
authorities have applied numerous classifica-
tion regimes at Guantánamo, making the 
transfer of information to, from, and about 
prisoners very difficult.
A complex regime governs information 
transfer at Guantánamo, with different rules 
for prisoners in various statuses. Former CIA 
prisoners have no access to telephone or 
ordinary mail, except to contact their 
families through the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross. Other prisoners (Camp 6) 
have the ability to arrange occasional 
telephone calls with their attorneys and 
family members, albeit with a member of a 
Privilege Review Team on the line with them 
to end communications if any information 
presumed either classified or inappropriate is 
conveyed. Most prisoners’ legal communica-
tions fall under protective orders issued by 
the District Court in D.C. and Joint Task 
Force-Guantánamo Bay, which provide that 
all of their communications are presumed 
classified until declassified by a Privilege 
Review Team (Eisenberg, 2009). 
Until recently, the prisoners charged with 
offenses in a military commission were 
governed by a separate set of orders, which 
were generally less restrictive. Those military 
commission orders treated prisoner commu-
nications as unclassified unless they concern 
specific torture-related categories (primarily 
location and personnel information). The 
categories did not include torture techniques 
a prisoner experienced or their symptoms – 
meaning that prisoner communications about 
their torture and enduring injuries were 
generally unclassified. The orders allow the 
attorneys limited authority to handle unclassi-
fied information without supervision, and 
provided a mechanism for the attorneys to 
obtain classification review in case of doubt. 
It was therefore possible for attorneys to 
share those torture details with treatment 
providers who could correspond with some 
Guantánamo prisoners through their 
attorneys or even offer remedies - as two of 
the authors have previously done. Such 
correspondence would necessarily be slow 
and limited by classification concerns, but 
could and did take place. 
In June 2017, however, the chief military 
commission judge, James Pohl, ruled that 
even unclassified legal mail from the former 
CIA prisoners could no longer be shared 
with members of the public, including 
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pendent organizations who routinely provide 
care for the imprisoned. Therefore, even that 
limited avenue of treatment for Guantánamo 
prisoners continuing to deteriorate from the 
effects of their torture may now be closed. 
The following statement from Mr. al 
Baluchi is an example of torture description 
that may be useful for rehabilitation provid-
ers. This statement had previously been 
cleared for public release. New statements 
may not now be shared with the public:
 
Medical infrastructure
Medical care of the prisoners is, in many 
ways, irreversibly damaged through destruc-
tion of the provider-patient relationship by 
doctors’ roles in the CIA torture.
The prisoners who still seek rehabilita-
tion from their American jailers face an 
uphill struggle with poorly-trained personnel 
and classification barriers. 
Psychologists in torture program
It is important to understand that the goal of 
CIA torture and CIDT was not short-term 
information, but rather long-term compli-
ance. The CIA view was that, “Effective 
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both physical and psychological pressures in 
a comprehensive, systematic, and cumulative 
manner to influence [prisoner] behavior, to 
overcome a detainee’s resistance posture” 
(CIA, 2004, p. 1). “Refined through years of 
practice, the agency’s psychological paradigm 
came to rely on a mix of sensory overload 
and sensory deprivation for a system attack 
on all human stimuli via seemingly banal 
procedures—manipulation of heat and cold, 
light and dark, noise and silence, isolation 
and the intense interrogation” (McCoy, 2012, 
53). The CIA thus specifically intended to 
alter the long-term psychological make-up of 
their prisoners.
One participating psychologist has made 
clear the participation of medical doctors and 
psychologists in the CIA program (Mitchell, 
2016). The Guantánamo Behavioral Science 
Consulting Teams also included psycholo-
gists. Given the participation of psychologists 
in the original abuse, the process of torture 
assessment outside the context of a trusting 
relationship itself evokes echoes of the torture 
(Pope, 2012). “Some of the acute neurobio-
logical responses to trauma may facilitate the 
encoding of traumatic memories. The 
memories of traumatic experiences remain 
indelible for many decades and are easily 
reawakened by all sorts of stimuli and 
stressors” (Charney, 1993). 
Evidence suggests that interrogators used 
techniques of sexual, religious and moral 
humiliation to break down the prisoners. 
Many of the techniques deliberately degrad-
ed the Islamic faith, for example, violating 
explicit taboos relating to women, pornogra-
phy and homosexuality. “Torturers targeted 
degradation of subject: sexual violations and 
humiliations . . . [and] desecration of 
religious objects and rituals” (Bufacchi & 
Arrigo, 2006, p. 356). In particular, interro-
gators used anal penetration as a tool of 
control, sometimes causing long-term 
damage to the survivors (SSCI, 2014).
Cultural norms mean that acknowledging 
sexual victimization from same- or opposite-
sex interrogators is especially difficult for 
Muslims imprisoned at Guantánamo (Pope, 
2012). “Implicit in these scenarios is the idea 
that sexual torture is a source of particular 
humiliation and un-manning for Muslims 
and that sexual freedoms are a particular 
treasure of the West” (Bhattacharyya, 2008, 
13). Among other symptoms, survivors of 
sexual trauma report deep feelings of shame 
and guilt (Oosterhoff et al., 2004, 71). Only 
a particularly sensitive and trusted profes-
sional can properly elicit and evaluate the 
sexual trauma of some of the Guantánamo 
prisoners.
Medical care at Guantánamo 
Joint Task Force-Guantánamo Bay, which 
runs the prisons, includes abundant medical 
and psychological staff, but does not include 
professionals specializing in torture rehabili-
tation. Assessing and treating torture 
survivors is a highly specialized field requir-
ing particularized competence (Pope, 2012).
According to a number of reports, 
medical and psychological personnel do not 
ask their patients at Guantánamo what 
happened to them during interrogation. 
Captain Albert J. Shimkus, USN (retired), 
commanded the Guantánamo hospital, told 
The New York Times that his medical staff 
“was dealing with the consequences of the 
interrogations without knowing what was 
going on.” (Apuzzo, Fink, & Risen, 2016).
In one of the rare studies of Guantánamo 
prisoner medical records, Iacopino & 
Xenakis reviewed the medical records of nine 
prisoners and compared them with other 
evidence of the prisoners’ abuse. They 
observed that, “The medical doctors and 
mental health personnel who treated the 
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document causes of the physical injuries and 
psychological symptoms they observed” 
(Iacopino & Xenakis, 2011, p. 4). 
Another reason a therapeutic relationship 
between military psychologists and Guan-
tánamo prisoners is virtually impossible is the 
lack of respect for a prisoner’s right to medical 
privacy. A prior policy required medical 
practitioners to provide medical information 
to the military and CIA on request (Bloche & 
Marks 2005). Prosecutors at Guantánamo 
claim the right to inspect prisoners’ medical 
records, and have done so on many occasions. 
Furthermore, prison authorities deny the 
prisoners access to their medical records on 
the basis that the medical records are 
classified. Even attorneys for the prisoners 
cannot access full versions of the medical 
records. The United States government has 
created a situation where the legal authorities 
seeking the execution (in some cases) of the 
prisoners can access their full medical files, 
but the putative patients and their defense 
teams cannot. It should be noted that this 
engenders numerous legal issues beyond 
failure to provide access to rehabilitation.
Other limitations on an effective and 
appropriate doctor-patient relationship 
include frequent rotations of staff, limited 
access to historical and personal information/
background. As active-duty military, the 
medical providers at Guantánamo serve 
limited rotations, both as part of ordinary 
military practice and, probably, as an 
anti-elicitation measure. These providers do 
not have access to any medical records from 
before September 2006. In fact, the authors 
have actually seen unclassified medical 
records describing 6 September 2006 (the 
date of transfer from black sites) as the 
patient’s birthday. 
Options for torture rehabilitation?
Given the massive obstacles to even basic 
medical treatment at Guantánamo, the 
possibilities for meaningful torture rehabilita-
tion are miniscule. However, small opportu-
nities to alleviate the ongoing torture effects 
may exist. Under current law, these possibili-
ties for treatment would have to take place 
outside the United States and take into 
account the security structure of Guantána-
mo imprisonment.
Treatment within the United States is 
impossible at this time. Current U.S. law 
prohibits the transfer of Guantánamo 
prisoners to the United States, even for 
medical treatment. This law could change, but 
would require a change in political currents.
The holistic treatment approach used by 
many treatment centers is also not possible at 
Guantánamo. Many people involved in 
rehabilitation of torture victims advocate 
holistic approaches which seek to restore the 
individual’s functioning in the context of 
family and community (Kira 2002). This 
approach is precluded by the restrictive 
environment at Guantánamo, which permits 
only specific group classes in Camp 6, [the 
camps], no classes in Camp 7, and only rare 
communication with family, largely  via letters.
One possible approach might be narrative 
exposure therapy (NET). NET is based on 
Testimony Method (Cienfuegos & Monelli, 
1983), which was developed specifically 
within a human rights framework to treat 
traumatized survivors of the Pinochet regime 
in Chile. NET procedure is two-fold; it 
places “focus on the habituation of emotion-
al responding to reminders of the traumatic 
event experienced and the construction of a 
detailed narrative of the event and its 
consequences” (Neuner, Schauer, Klaschik, 
Karunakara, & Elbert, , 2004, p. 580). 
Given the extraordinary efforts of the 
United States to silence the Guantánamo 
prisoners, telling their stories may have 
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share torture details through legal mail may 
now be curtailed, as mentioned above. 
Mahmadou Ould Slahi wrote his Guantána-
mo Diary through short declassified state-
ments over a period of years, to express his 
experiences at Guantánamo and elsewhere. 
Ammar al Baluchi has had a number of 
statements regarding his experiences 
declassified, allowing him to tell parts of his 
story, albeit in a fragmented way (Amnesty 
International, 2017). Abu Zubaydah, 
through his attorney, has discussed his 
interest in describing part of his experience 
through courtroom testimony, although his 
most recent effort to testify did not succeed 
(Rosenberg, 2017).
Some possibility may also exist for 
treatment by correspondence, if the rule 
regarding detainee statements was once 
again changed such that they were subject to 
“public” release after declassification. 
Although many treatment modalities require 
a personal connection between therapist and 
patient, it might be possible to provide 
treatment through guided self-help. For 
example, control-focused behavioral 
treatment is designed for implementation 
outside traditional therapy channels, and 
might present a possible vehicle for treat-
ment (Ba o lu & Mineka 1992; Ba o lu & 
alcio lu 2011). The correspondence 
involved in treatment would necessarily be 
slow, but could be carried out under the 
existing security structure at Guantánamo.
Conclusion
By adopting a policy of torture followed by 
imprisonment, the United States has created 
a terrible conundrum for itself. It has a legal, 
moral, and ethical responsibility to provide 
access to rehabilitation for torture survivors, 
but is instead imprisoning them indefinitely 
and subjecting them to conditions and 
restrictions which make such rehabilitation 
almost impossible. The United States has 
constructed a security regime which 
prevents its military medical care providers 
from effectively treating prisoners seeking 
rehabilitation, and bars almost all other 
qualified professionals from offering and 
providing such rehabilitation service to those 
prisoners. Rehabilitation for survivors of 
torture and CIDT at Guantánamo will 
require rethinking traditional models of 
treatment to work around the United States’ 
current regulation and policies – or humani-
tarian transfer of detainees to countries that 
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